This article looks at the prospects and the reality of British commercial activity in Siberia in the early twentieth century, before the outbreak of the First World War, and is based on contemporary comments by travellers, businessmen and commercial agents. Contemporaries agreed that the dynamic Siberian economy opened up opportunities for British exports and trade. British firms, however, lagged behind her commercial rivals, in particular Germany, and the United States. The article explores the reasons for this and also looks at the subjects of the British empire who went to Siberia and the conditions under which they worked. The artilce demonstrates the vibrancy of Siberian economic development in this period and the active participation of Western powers in this process. British trade, major shortcomings in the way that British business was conducted meant that
Britain was not able to compete successfully with her rivals, in particular Germany and the United States. 6 British commentators all agreed that Siberia began to undergo significant change at the end of the nineteenth century. This was true of tourists, adventurers, and businessmen who came to Siberia, and also of British agents operating in Russia and Siberia. In reality these categories of travellers often overlapped: tourists were sometimes also assessing the prospects for trade and investment either for themselves of for others; commercial agents provided a service for the British government but also traded on their own account. There were many ways in which their views could reach official circles, businessmen and a wider audience.
The stimulus for economic growth in Siberia was the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway, a project which was inaugurated in 1891 and had its first main section completed by 1904 (although the line was not finally completed until 1916). At the very end of the nineteenth century, Robert Jefferson journeyed on the newly-constructed stretch of the TransSiberian railway and visited gold mines in Eastern Siberia. This was before the line was completed and conditions for the tourist were primitive. Jefferson advised with not untypical British superiority of the time that relations were difficult when "not dealing with a civilized country, but one which is even more barbarous and primitive than the most barbarous and primitive of the British colonies." Nevertheless, he considered that Siberia was a "land of promise" because of its richness of resources and cheap labour. Presciently, however, he added "whether Englishmen will grasp the opportunity is another matter." 7 By the first decade of the twentieth century, Siberia had come to be seen as an El Dorado for British commercial interests. Exports of grain from Siberia to European Russia tripled between 1900 and 1914. Mines -gold, silver, copper, coal -increased output significantly, and the number of workers in mining tripled in the period 1897 to 1913. 8 At the same time the potential market for British goods in Siberia rose as the population increased: the first wave of internal migration took place in the 1890s after the Emancipation of the Serfs enabled peasants to leave their villages more freely, and the second after the Stolypin reforms of 1906 when peasants were encouraged, and assisted, to migrate to Siberia. After 1906, some 600,000 people per year migrated to Siberia, mainly to the countryside but the railway also lured peasants to the towns from within and outside Siberia. The population of Siberia almost doubled from 5.8 million in 1893 to over 10 million in 1913. Turner noted that the number of dairies in Siberia had grown from 140 in 1898 to 2,630 by 1904, and that the town of Biisk in the Altai was "a coming centre for the butter trade" and considered that there was scope not only for Britain to benefit from the butter trade but also for the export of British agricultural machinery. 
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The Lena goldfields were the largest goldfields in the Russian empire. The fields were originally owned by a purely Russian firm; the firm was then heavily invested in by British shareholders and, although the managerial staff of the firm remained Russian. 22 In April 1912, there were extensive and bitter strikes in the Lena goldfields which led to the massacre of many unarmed strikers (leaving possibly up to 270 dead). 23 That created an awkward situation for British investors, and British shareholders. The Economist (a paper/magazine founded in 1843 in London which focused on economic issues affecting Britain) in 1912 noted that the Lena goldfields had Russian management but were controlled by British capital, and considered that low wages, abuses in the mine shops, poor barracks and poor clothing had led to the discontent. 24 The British Russian Year Book for 1914 noted tersely the "labour difficulties" which had occurred at the Lena goldfields which "interfered seriously in the working of these fields." Nevertheless, it reported that "All over the Urals 27 The Kamchatka fishing industry was largely in the hands of the Japanese, but Britain imported frozen fish and caviar -Hodgson noted that a British firm had set up a cannery in Ust Kamchatsk 1909. 28 The main import from the Far East was, however, soya beans which came from Manchuria but were carried in British ships -200,000 tons in 1909, an amount which remained at or above this level until 1913. 29 The fur trade involved import from Siberia of "dressed and undressed skins," but Britain also exported furs to Russia from Canada. 30 Britain still imported mammoth ivory, as she had done from the seventeenth century and earlier. 31 The most significant export from Siberia to Britain in the early twentieth century, however, was butter. The majority of co-operatives were Russian of course, and the main foreign investment in dairies were Danish, but some British entrepreneurs set up in Siberia:
the Wardropper family had a "thriving cheese and butter factory" near Tiumen', in western Siberia, in the early twentieth century, and had imported "a herd of pedigree Jersey cows." 32 Turner noted in 1905 that eleven large London butter importers were doing business in Siberia. 33 In 1908 The Times noted that British firms were setting up cold stores in Kurgan for the preservation of butter. 34 In the period 1911 to 1913 the so-called "Cheliabinsk tariff," that is, an internal duty on goods passing through Cheliabinsk in the Ural mountains into and through European Russia to Western Europe, was gradually abolished. This helped exports from Siberiamainly grain but also other agricultural products -and in particular immediately increased butter exports which reached their peak in 1913. 35 The Russian Year Book for 1912 noted that the value of Siberian butter exports to European Russia and Western Europe had risen from £745,000 in 1899 to £5,109,000 in 1909, and the quantity of butter had increased from 3,500,000 poods in 1909 to 4,500,000 poods in 1912. 36 To put this in comparative perspective, a report on trade of the United States in 1912 noted that Britain was the largest butter importer from Russia with a total value of imports over 15.5 million dollars, and that imports had increased from the previous year. 37 In 1912, Price noted that the butter industry has been dominated by Danes and Germans "but English firms have of late years been taking considerable interest in this business." 38 In 1912 a British firm established a factory at Biisk to make Cheshire cheese. 39 The success in investment, and in butter industry, were not, however, replicated by
British exports to Siberia. The main obstacle to exploiting Siberia's potential was deemed to be the inability of British business to compete, and their lack of willingness to compete, with their commercial rivals, and in particular with Germany, but also in certain areas with the United States, Austria and Denmark. Fears that Germany was usurping Britain as an exporter were commonplace in the press and in official circles from the 1870s. It may be that overall Britain's perceived decline was exaggerated -Britain consistently had higher exports than Germany -but there is no doubt that in Europe, and in particular in the Russian empire, Germany was taking Britain's place as the main supplier of a whole range of exports. 40 To this extent, Siberia is only one example of Britain's failure to compete but the particular circumstances there exposed both general and specific weaknesses in British commercial activity and the inability to overcome these weaknesses.
British eye-witnesses, newspaper columnists and commercial agents complained regularly about the lack of British competitiveness in the early twentieth century. In 1901, the Manchester Guardian (founded in 1821, originally to represent the interests of Manchester cotton traders) reported a lecture given by a Mr Brice to the Manchester Geographical
Society on "The Commercial Development of Siberia: Prospects of Manchester Trade." Brice described Siberia as a "magnificent market" for Manchester exports such as cottons and machinery but bemoaned the "amazing conservatism of the British manufacturer" and noted that the Germans and Americans had poorer goods but lower prices which gave them an obvious commercial advantage. 41 Eye-witnesses also testified to the failure of British firms to take advantage of the opportunities in Siberia. "British firms, unfortunately, are conspicuous by their absence" commented Henry Norman the following year. 42 John Foster Fraser, a
British travel writer, looked upon "Siberia as the ultimate great food-producing region on earth" but noted that "Americans and Germans are already in the country opening up commerce"; while "Britishers, however, lag behind". 43 In his frustration he commented that:
"All I saw that was British was sauce … That my country should purvey to Siberia little else than sauce -I felt like smashing the bottle." Cooke, the USA was "first" and the British "nowhere," and that this was due to the high cost of British goods and poor marketing, all of which meant that the Siberian "market, with exception of one or two special requirements, is slipping altogether out of our hands." 50 In 1906, Cooke reported that Germany accounted for 42 per cent of the total imports to Siberia, whilst those from Britain comprised only 17.2 per cent. He reiterated that part of the attraction was that Germans gave credit more easily than British exporters and were prepared to start with small amount of business to build up customer base. Many German traders were also from the Baltic States and had the advantage that they were subjects of the Russian 52 Some British manufactured goods were clearly valued and bought irrespective of all the shortcomings listed above.
The British government was not oblivious to the failure of British traders to compete with Germany, in Russia and elsewhere. One particular criticism of British policy was the failure to appoint consuls and vice-consuls in major towns compared with other countries, something which the government began to rectify from the 1880s by appointing commercial agents. 53 The government was, however, slow to appoint consuls to Siberia. In 1906, a question was raised at the House of Commons concerning the lack of a consul at Vladivostok. 54 The former commercial agent in Vladivostok, Edgar Schwabe, wrote to the Foreign Office and argued that a British subject with the formal title and status of a consul would be more beneficial to British trade than a commercial agent, whilst also noting that both China and Japan had appointed consuls to Vladivostok. The argument was accepted and Robert Hodgson, who was currently employed in British service in Marseilles and who knew "some Russian," was appointed as Vice-Consul in Vladivostok. As the Foreign Office noted dryly: The new Vice-Consul will have to be an exceptionally good man because the post will be practically independent besides being a somewhat difficult one." He noted that trade "was very much in German hands" and that three-quarters of imports were from Germany. Nevertheless, British goods included galvanized iron, cloth, clothing, boots, paint, biscuits, preserves and tinned fruit (the latter from Australia), stationary and whisky. The following year he made the same points and considered that it was disappointing that there were "no signs apparent of any determined intention on the part of our manufacturers to improve their position." Krasnoiarsk. 57 Indeed, the question of vice consuls was raised again in the House of Commons in 1911. 58 In 1913 an article in The Times entitled "The Rise of Siberia" portrayed a familiar picture of the decline and "decadence" of British engineering and the loss of trade to Germany and the USA in Siberia in part because of the reluctance to give credit. 59 The most optimistic commentators recognized that Siberia posed special challenges for conducting business, although this was true for all exporters to Siberia and not merely British traders. Even after the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway, moving people and goods around Siberia was far more difficult than in European Russia, and was made more so by the remote location of many of the resources. Ore from the Spasskii copper mine in western Siberia had to be transported from the mine to the railway by bullock carts in the summer, and camel sledges in the winter. 60 James Edward Wardropper, whose family were based near Tiumen', in the more developed western Siberia, commented that travel was "hazardous because the roads were merely cart tracks with deep ruts." 61 "Roads are terribly bad" commented Beaven tersely. Oxen had to be used to transport his factory machinery from the railhead to a mine in Petropavlovsk (in present day north Kazakhstan), although he noted that there were "plenty of camels in Petropavlovsk." 62 The extremecold posed problems for anyone who ventured to Russia in the winter months but is perhaps strange that Britons, who after all had an empire at the time which For young, fit, men the experience in Siberia could also be invigorating and pleasurable. Turner visited the Altai primarily for mountaineering and was joined in this pursuit by young members of the Cattley family. John Wardell was employed as an engineer in the Spasskii copper mine and recounted his pleasure at hunting and riding on the steppe. 69 We have a unique record of both the pleasure and the difficulties of life in a Siberian factory through the log book of Edward Beaven, who spent nineteenth months attempting to install and run machinery in a meat processing plant in Borovoe, near Petropavlovsk. He clearly loved some the freedom of the outdoor life, swimming in the "magnificent" lakes, riding, walking: "A most magnificent day, had a fine walk across lake & back through the woods" he recorded one day in a frosty January. 70 But the slowness and difficult of getting machinery unloaded and then delivered by train to the nearest station, and from there to the factory by carts, was a frustrating experience. Goods he had dispatched from the station had not arrived at the factory when he expected. Trying to conduct business at the factory was also frustrating: the plant was primitive so that it was hard to keep production going (as he noted one day, "things not going well ... steam in pipes & pipes have icicles on them, that is, at a leaky place"); safety was poor -one Kirghiz workman was "terribly scalded" and later The establishment of a Vice-Consular Office in Vladivostok meant that records were kept of citizens of the British Empire who ended up in that port. They were a mixed group.
Between 1908 and 1914 forty five men and women arrived in Vladivostok: many of them were in the areas of commerce which have been discussed above, including merchants, engineers, a timber merchant, an office manager, a commercial traveller, an accountant, a financier, and a metallurgist. A number of Indians also worked as watchmen on the river. The list of British residents also included a jockey and his trainer, both from Sydney, five English language teachers, and four governesses. 83 A list of deaths of British subjects in Vladivostok in the same period included a master mariner, a merchant, an assistant school master, a business manager, an apprentice, a clerk and a teacher. 84 Work for an English speaker as a teacher or in an office was not guaranteed even in this remote spot. The Office advised
Florence Farnborough "not to come to Vladivostok for work," 85 a G. Shackelton was informed that there were "no openings for" him as a teacher of English, and G. Hadden was told that he had a "small choice of finding employment as a teacher, or in office." 86 Commentators on Siberia had a great interest in its economic potential but not oblivious to the fact that Siberia was also developing culturally during this period.. Several travellers noted the establishment of Tomsk University, which had been founded in 1898, and its "handsome buildings." 87 Turner noted that there 29 educational establishments in Omsk and 3 libraries. 88 By 1910 it was in fact estimated that there were 4,656 pupils of both sexes in schools in Omsk 89 -the town had expanded rapidly as a result of the construction of the railway. In Irkutsk, Fraser noted the "many schools, the philanthropic institutions, the museum." 90 Price found Krasnoiarsk dirty and muddy, even in 1912, but also found three "well organized" hospitals, two middle schools, a public library (albeit accommodated in "a low dingy shed"). 91 Newspapers also reported on non-economic matters relating to Siberia.
In 1908 The Times reported on the discovery of the bones of a Siberian mammoth. In 1912
The Times published an article on "Education in Siberia," and considered that Tomsk University would be "a civilizing influence which will commend it to the humane and the enlightened in all parts of the word." 92 The Manchester Guardian reported on a number of events and publications concerning Siberia, including notices of "The Marvellous Playing
Horses" and jugglers from Siberia, advertisements for books of travels in Siberia, lectures by members of the British and Foreign Bible Society on Siberia, and a film of an expedition to Siberia at picture house. Lectures were given not only on economic potential but on the fauna, flora and people of Siberia on Siberia at Geographical societies in London and other cities in Great Britain.
For all the interest shown in Siberia's economic potential, and for all the attention its development received at home, this was not a success story for Britain. British investors were important, and some Britons made a life for themselves in Siberia, but on the whole British exporters never managed to compete successfully with the Germans and the Americans.
British commercial practices and British government policy towards trade were largely to blame -the lack of flexibility over credit, the failure of many exporters to learn Russian, the slowness in appointing consuls. By 1914, it had been accepted that Germany dominated the Russian trade, both in Siberia and in European Russia. 93 The only hope left was that the outbreak of war would benefit British trade because of anti-German feeling in Russia. The
Russian Year Book for 1916 pointed out that "the present is the time to capture this market, not after the war -it will be too late." 94 The potential new economic opportunities and the impressive internal developments in Siberia did not, moreover, entirely erase the negative image of Siberia from popular imagination. Prospects for British exports and investment merged uneasily with the image of Siberia as a place of oppression, cruelty and hardship. As
The Economist noted in 1911 that "Siberia still lingers in the English mind as a land of convict prisons and perpetual snows, of frozen tundras, and gloomy forests." 
